The Tribunals Bill, 2026: A Constitutional Innovation or a Missed Opportunity? A Critical Examination of the Proposed Jurisdiction of Ghana’s New Tribunal System
By His Honour Festus Fovi Nukunu — Circuit Court Judge
(The views expressed in this article are entirely personal and do not represent those of the Judicial Service of Ghana.)
Introduction
The Tribunals Bill, 2026, presently before Parliament, has reignited a national conversation on the place of tribunals within Ghana’s constitutional democracy. The Bill has generated divergent opinions among Members of Parliament, judges, legal practitioners, academics and civil society organisations. While some regard it as a progressive reform designed to improve access to justice and reduce the increasing backlog of criminal cases in the ordinary courts, others fear that it may revive memories of the Public Tribunals established during the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) era, which attracted widespread criticism for alleged violations of due process and fundamental human rights.
The debate is both understandable and healthy. Tribunals occupy a unique position in Ghana’s constitutional and political history. Nevertheless, any meaningful assessment of the Bill should be grounded not in historical sentiment alone but in the constitutional framework within which the proposed tribunals are intended to operate.
The Constitutional Basis for Tribunals
Contrary to the impression created by some commentators, tribunals are not foreign to the 1992 Constitution.
Article 125(1) provides that justice emanates from the people and shall be administered in the name of the Republic by the Judiciary, which shall be independent and subject only to the Constitution.
More significantly, Article 125(2) expressly provides that: “The citizens of Ghana shall participate in the administration of justice through the institutions of public and customary tribunals and the jury and assessor systems.”
This provision demonstrates that the framers of the Constitution deliberately preserved tribunals as part of Ghana’s justice delivery system. The Constitution did not abolish tribunals. Rather, it retained them within a constitutional framework founded upon judicial independence, due process and the rule of law.
Articles 142 and 143 further recognise Regional Tribunals as part of the Judiciary, although these tribunals have remained largely dormant since the advent of constitutional rule.
Historical Experience and Public Perception
Public apprehension regarding tribunals is deeply rooted in Ghana’s political history. The Public Tribunals established under the Public Tribunals Law, 1982 (P.N.D.C.L. 24), as amended by P.N.D.C.L. 78, became associated with allegations of political interference, procedural irregularities and violations of fundamental rights. The Community Public Tribunals, in particular, attracted criticism from lawyers, judges, human rights advocates and the international community.
These experiences explain why any proposal to revive tribunals naturally evokes caution. Such concerns are legitimate. They should neither be dismissed nor underestimated.
The Purpose of the Tribunals Bill
The explanatory memorandum accompanying the Bill makes clear that Parliament seeks to establish the jurisdiction, composition and administration of tribunals in accordance with the Constitution while creating a Tribunal Oversight Committee to ensure accountability.
The Bill seeks to fill a legislative vacuum that has existed since the coming into force of the 1992 Constitution. More importantly, it seeks to remove the historical stigma attached to tribunals by ensuring that they operate under constitutional safeguards, judicial supervision and appellate review. The proposed tribunals are therefore intended to complement—not replace—the existing courts.
The Case for and Against the Bill
The legal community remains divided. One school of thought argues that creating tribunals alone will not guarantee expeditious justice because the causes of delay are largely structural: inadequate numbers of judges, prosecutors and court staff, insufficient courtrooms, logistical challenges and frequent adjournments.
This argument deserves careful consideration. The opposing view is that tribunals will substantially reduce the workload of the Circuit Courts and High Courts by sharing jurisdiction over specified categories of criminal cases, thereby enabling judges to dispose of matters more efficiently.
This argument is equally persuasive. The success of the proposed Tribunal System will ultimately depend not merely upon its creation but upon effective administration, adequate resources, competent personnel and efficient case management.
A Commendable Reform That Requires Jurisdictional Refinement
In my respectful opinion, the Bill represents a welcome constitutional development. Ghana’s courts continue to experience increasing caseloads, particularly at the Circuit Court level. Any reform that expands adjudicatory capacity while preserving constitutional safeguards deserves serious support.
However, the success of any specialised tribunal depends not simply upon its existence but upon the jurisdiction entrusted to it.
It is in this respect that the Bill requires further refinement. The principal weakness of the Bill lies not merely in the offences assigned to the proposed tribunals but in the absence of a coherent jurisdictional philosophy linking the Regional Tribunal and the District Tribunal.
The Jurisdiction of the Regional Tribunal Is Unduly Narrow; Section 16 adopts a specialised approach by assigning jurisdiction over economic crimes, narcotics offences, customs offences, tax offences, mining offences and offences against the State.
This represents a sound legislative policy.
However, the jurisdiction remains unnecessarily limited. The Regional Tribunal ought to become Ghana’s principal specialist criminal court for serious economic and regulatory criminality. Yet the Bill excludes offences involving dishonesty, despite their increasing prevalence and complexity.
Fraud, stealing, fraudulent breach of trust, obtaining by false pretences, causing financial loss, corruption-related offences and similar crimes often involve sophisticated financial transactions, documentary evidence and forensic accounting. These offences naturally lend themselves to specialised adjudication.
Historically, many such offences fell within the jurisdiction of the former Public Tribunals because Parliament recognised their economic significance.
Accordingly, Parliament should expand section 16 to include offences of dishonesty under the Criminal Offences Act together with related economic offences created under other enactments.
The District Tribunal Lacks a Clear Jurisdictional Identity
The more significant concern arises under section 19. Rather than conferring a carefully defined specialist jurisdiction, section 19 grants the District Tribunal concurrent criminal jurisdiction with the Circuit Court over virtually every criminal offence except treason, indictable offences and offences punishable by death.
This effectively creates another ordinary criminal court operating alongside the existing District and Circuit Courts.
If that is Parliament’s intention, one must legitimately ask why a separate Tribunal System is required.
Specialised tribunals exist because particular categories of disputes require specialised adjudication—not because there is a shortage of courts exercising ordinary criminal jurisdiction.
A Missing Hierarchy Within the Tribunal System
The Bill also fails to establish a logical institutional relationship between the Regional Tribunal and the District Tribunal.
Ordinarily, a lower tribunal complements the work of a higher tribunal by determining less serious matters arising within the same specialised field.
Here, however, the Regional Tribunal specialises in economic and regulatory offences while the District Tribunal is assigned public order offences and minor nuisance offences.
There is no coherent relationship between their jurisdictions.
The Tribunal System therefore lacks an identifiable legislative architecture.
Public Order Offences and Publication of False News
The inclusion of offences such as riot, provocation of riot and publication of false news deserves reconsideration.
These are conventional public order offences that have been competently administered by the ordinary courts for decades.
More significantly, publication of false news engages constitutional questions concerning freedom of expression under Article 21.
Given Ghana’s constitutional history, assigning speech-related offences to newly created tribunals risks reviving public perceptions associated with the former Public Tribunals.
Whether intended or not, legislation should avoid institutional arrangements capable of generating unnecessary public apprehension.
Public confidence is indispensable to the legitimacy of any tribunal system.
Minor Offences Should Not Define a Specialist Tribunal
Section 19 further assigns offences relating to littering, depositing refuse and disturbing the peace.
Some of these offences attract only a maximum fine of ten penalty units.
With respect, it is difficult to justify establishing an entirely new adjudicatory institution partly to determine offences carrying such modest penalties.
The defining jurisdiction of a specialist tribunal ought to reflect the seriousness and specialised nature of the institution itself.
The Way Forward
The Bill presents Parliament with an excellent opportunity to create a genuinely specialised Tribunal System.
To achieve that objective, Parliament should reconsider the jurisdiction of both tribunals.
The Regional Tribunal should exercise jurisdiction over serious economic crimes, offences involving dishonesty and complex regulatory offences.
The District Tribunal should exercise jurisdiction over less serious specialised offences arising under environmental protection, public health, fisheries, forestry, wildlife, food and drugs regulation, local governance, physical planning, sanitation, waste management, consumer protection and similar regulatory legislation.
Such a structure would create a coherent hierarchy, promote the development of specialised judicial expertise and clearly distinguish tribunals from the ordinary criminal courts.
Most importantly, it would preserve the specialised identity of the Tribunal System while complementing the work of the existing courts.
Conclusion
The Tribunals Bill, 2026 is a commendable legislative initiative. It demonstrates Parliament’s commitment to strengthening Ghana’s justice delivery system through constitutionally established tribunals operating under judicial supervision and subject to appellate review.
Its long-term success, however, will depend upon the clarity and coherence of the jurisdiction conferred upon those tribunals.
A tribunal system should not merely duplicate the work of existing courts. It should possess a clearly defined specialist identity founded upon coherent legislative policy and institutional purpose.
If Parliament broadens the jurisdiction of the Regional Tribunal to include offences of dishonesty, redefines the District Tribunal as a genuinely specialised adjudicatory body and aligns the jurisdictions of both tribunals within a coherent hierarchy, Ghana will have a modern tribunal system worthy of its constitutional aspirations.
The lessons of history should guide legislative reform, but they should not prevent constitutional innovation. Properly structured, adequately resourced and carefully supervised, the proposed tribunals can strengthen access to justice, reduce delays, promote judicial efficiency and enhance public confidence in the administration of justice.
The opportunity now before Parliament is not merely to establish new tribunals, but to create enduring institutions whose jurisdiction reflects the specialised role envisaged for them by the Constitution. That opportunity should not be missed.
